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1 Introduction
We study the compatibility of efficiency, stability and group strategy-proofness
in resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. Those properties are
important for assignment mechanisms, but they are not compatible, in general
(see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
Kojima (2013) shows that the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mech-
anism is equivalent to the existence of an efficient and stable mechanism. In
particular, Kojima (2013) characterizes those priority structures that allow sta-
ble and strategy-proof mechanisms as the ones that satisfy a condition called
essential homogeneity. If essential homogeneity is satisfied, courses can have
different priorities only on top ranked students. If the courses have few seats
available, essential homogeneity is extremely requiring. For instance, if one of
the courses has only one seat available, essential homogeneity amounts to all
courses having the same priorities. On the other hand, if the courses have a
large supply of seats, essential homogeneity is more permissive.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that collusion is a common behavior among
students trying to enroll in over-demanded courses. This collusion is a concern
for university officers, since it makes difficult to assess the demand for courses.
The possibility of group manipulation is also a relevant concern in other multi-
unit assignment problems such as the assignment of landing slots (see Schummer
and Vohra, 2013 and Schummer and Abizada, 2017).
In this note we explore the possibility of designing mechanisms that are
stable and group strategy-proof. We exploit the characterization of essential
homogeneity in terms of a serial dictatorship provided by Kojima (2013) to
prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent re-
quirements when imposed on stable mechanisms. Thus, the essential homo-
geneity of a priority system characterizes both requirements. We also suggest
that an alternative proof of our result could employ the equivalence between
essential homogeneity and the consistency of the student-optimal stable mech-
anism proved by Kojima (2013).
This equivalence is a surprising, albeit simple, observation. In general, group
strategy-proofness is much more requiring than strategy-proofness. In partic-
ular, in the school assignment model, the student-optimal stable mechanism
always provides a stable and strategy-proof assignment. However, efficiency
and group strategy-proofness require priorities to satisfy an acyclicity condi-
tion (see Ergin, 2002). In the school assignment problem, Ergin (2002) proves
that the existence of a stable and group strategy-proof mechansim is equivalent
to the existence of a stable and efficient mechanism and to the consistency of
the student-optimal stable mechanism. Thus, our characterization extends Er-
gin’s results to the course assignment problem and contributes in explaining the
restrictiveness of imposing strategy-proofness on stable mechanisms.
Finally, we observe that restricting the demand of the students does not lead
to more permissive results. Even if a student can apply to at most two courses,
essential homogeneity is still a necessary condition for the existence of a stable
and strategy-proof mechanism.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents the results. Section 4 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are a finite set of courses C and a finite set of students S, with S∩C = ∅.
Each student s ∈ S has a strict preference relation Ps over the set of subsets
of C. For all c, c′ ∈ C, we write cPsc′ and cPs∅ instead of {c}Ps {c′} and
{c}Ps∅, respectively. We assume that the preference relation of each student is
responsive (see Roth 1985), with demand qs. Formally, we assume that for
each C ′ ⊆ C and for all c, c′ ∈ C \ C ′, the following hold:
(1) if |C ′| < qs, then C ′ ∪ {c}PsC ′ ∪ {c′} if and only if cPsc′,
(2) if |C ′| < qs, then C ′ ∪ {c}Ps∅ if and only if cPs∅,
(3) if |C ′| > qs, then ∅PsC ′.
The set of all responsive preferences is denoted by P. For each s ∈ S, Rs
denotes weak preferences. For the preferences of students on individual courses
we use the notation Ps : c1, c2, ..., ch meaning that ciPscj for i < j and chPs∅.
For each S′ ⊆ S, set PS′ = (Ps)s∈S′ ∈ P|S
′|. For each s ∈ S set P−s = PS\{s}.
Let s ∈ S, and let C ′ ⊆ C. The choice set from C ′, Chs (C ′, Ps) is s’s favorite
subset of C ′; formally, Chs (C ′, Ps) = A if and only if A ⊆ C ′, ARsA′ for each
A′ ⊆ C ′. When there is no ambiguity about preferences, we write Chs (C ′) for
Chs (C
′, Ps).
Each course c ∈ C is characterized by priority c, which is a strict, com-
plete, and transitive binary relation over S. Each c ∈ C has a supply of qc,
which is the maximum number of students who can enroll in c. A priority
structure is a pair (, qC), where = (c)c∈C and qC = (qc)c∈C .
A matching is a function µ : S ∪ C → 2C ∪ 2S such that, for each s ∈ S
and each c ∈ C, µ(s) ∈ 2C , µ(c) ∈ 2S , |µ (c)| ≤ qc and c ∈ µ (s) if and only
if s ∈ µ (c). The set of all matchings is denoted by M. Matching µ is Pareto
efficient if there is no matching µ′ such that µ′ (s)Rsµ (s) for each s ∈ S and
µ′ (s)Psµ (s) for at least one s ∈ S.
Matching µ is blocked by a pair (s, c) ∈ S×C if s /∈ µ (c), c ∈ Chs (µ (s) ∪ {c})
and either |µ (c)| < qc or there exists s′ ∈ µ (c) such that s c s′. Matching
µ is individually rational if, for each s ∈ S, Chs (µ (s)) = µ (s). Finally, a
matching µ is stable for (S,C, P,, qC) if it is individually rational and there
exists no pair blocking it.
A mechanism is a function ϕ : P |S| → M. It is efficient if ϕ (P ) is a
Pareto efficient matching for each P ∈ P |S|. It is stable if ϕ (P ) is a stable
matching for each P ∈ P |S|. It is strategy-proof if ϕ (P )Rsϕ (P ′s, P−s) for
each P ∈ P |S|, s ∈ S and P ′s ∈ P. It is group strategy-proof if there do not
exist S′ ⊆ S and P ′S′ ∈ P|S
′| such that ϕ (P ′S′ , P−S′)Rsϕ (P ) for each s ∈ S′
and ϕ (P ′S′ , P−S′)Psϕ (P ) for at least one s ∈ S′.
If each agent has responsive preferences the set of stable matchings is a
nonempty complete lattice (see Blair, 1988) and there exists a mechanism which
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is Pareto superior to all other stable mechanisms, which is called student-
optimal stable mechanism and is denoted by µS (P ). Formally, for each
P ∈ P |S| and for each matching µ, stable for (S,C, P,, qC), µS (P ) (s)Rsµ (s)
for each s ∈ S.
The priority structure (, qC) satisfies satisfies essential homogeneity if
there exist no a, b ∈ C and t, u ∈ S such that:
(1) t a u and u b t, and
(2) there exist Sa, Sb ⊆ S \ {a, b} such that |Sa| = qa − 1, |Sb| = qb − 1 and
s a u for each s ∈ Sa, s  t for each s ∈ Sb.
Theorem 1, in Kojima (2013) proves that the essential homogeneity of a pri-
ority structure is equivalent to the existence of a stable and efficient mechanism
and to the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
3 Results
First, we prove that the student-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-
proof when the essential homogeneity condition holds. The proof is straightfor-
ward. Theorem 3 in Kojima (2013) shows that, if a priority structure satisfies
essential homogeneity, the student-optimal stable mechanism can be obtained
as a serial dictatorship, where the students choose in the order determined by
the priorities of any course of minimal capacity. Thus, the proof consists in ob-
serving that a serial dictatorship is also group strategy-proof. For completeness,
we provide a proof in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Assume that the priority structure (, qC) satisfies essential homo-
geneity. Then the student-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof.
Integrating Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in Kojima (2013) we obtain.
Theorem 1 Given (, qC), the following conditions are equivalent.
(1) There exists a stable and efficient mechanism.
(2) There exists a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
(3) There exists a stable and group strategy-proof mechanism.
(4) The priority structure (, qC) is essentially homogeneous.
A mechanism is consistent if, whenever the assignment of a course to a
student is removed from the problem, the assignment of the remaining seats
(for all courses) does not change. Theorem 4 in Kojima (2013) proves the
equivalence between the existence of a stable and efficient mechanism and the
consistency of the student-optimal stable mechanism. An alternative, but less
transparent proof of Theorem 1 could employ this result following the lines of
the proof of Theorem 1 in Ergin (2002).
Allowing for multi-unit demand makes strategy-proofness a very requir-
ing condition in assignment models with priorities. The reader might wonder
whether this is a consequence of the fact that the designer must consider any
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possible demand of the students. This assumption may appear too restric-
tive since in real world applications students can enroll in a limited number of
courses. We prove that this is not the case: if students can enroll in at most two
courses, essential homogeneity is still a necessary requirement for the existence
of a strategy-proof mechanism.
Proposition 1 Assume that (, qC) is not essentially homogeneous. Then
there exists P ∈ P |S|such that qs ≤ 2 for each s ∈ S and P ′t ∈ P with q′t ≤ 2, for
some t ∈ S such that, for any stable mechanism, ϕ, ϕ (P ′t , P−t) (t)Ptϕ (P ) (t).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 can be explained through a simple exam-
ple. Let us assume that there are are only two students, two courses and that
each course has one vacant seat. Let (, qC) be not essentially homogeneous.
Let a, b ∈ C and t, u ∈ S as in the definition of essential homogeneity and as-
sume that Pt : b, a, qt = 2, Pu : a, b, qu = 1. There is a unique stable matching
µ, where µ (t) = a and µ (u) = b. In this situation, student t competes with
student u for both courses, losing her favorite course b. However, if she reveals
preferences P ′t : b, she does no longer compete for course b since student u’s
favorite course is a. Indeed, this deviation is profitable for t when any stable
mechanism is employed because she obtains course b.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we show the equivalence of imposing group strategy-proofness,
strategy-proofness or efficiency on stable mechanisms when studying the alloca-
tion of indivisible goods to a set of agents with multi-unit demand. The essential
homogeneity of the priority structure is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence such mechanisms. We also find that it is not possible to relax the
characterization by imposing caps on agents’ demands. Future research look-
ing for positive results on a larger set of priority structures should move in a
different direction. For instance, it could explore non-revelation mechanisms,
relaxing the equilibrium concept. An alternative to this approach is to reduce
the stability requirement on the mechanism, when looking for strategy-proof
mechanisms.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let c be a course of minimal capacity, which is let c such
that qc = min {qc′ | c′ ∈ C}. For each l = 1, ..., |S|, let sl ∈ S be the l-th ranked
student according to c, formally s = sl if and only if |{s′ ∈ S | s′ c s}| =
l − 1. Define µ (P ) (s1) = Chs1 (C). For each t, 2 ≤ l ≤ |S|, let Al (P ) ={
c′ ∈ C | ⋃l′<l,c′∈µ(P,q)(sl′ ) {sl′} < qc′}, be the set of courses that have vacant
seats when is sl’s turn. Define µ (P ) (sl) = Chsl (Al (P )). For each c ∈
C, set µ (P ) (c) =
⋃
c∈µ(P )(sl) {sl}. Since (, qC) satisfies essential homo-
geneity, Theorem 3 in Kojima (2013) implies µ (P ) = µS (P ) for each P ∈
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P |S|. Thus, in order to complete the proof of the claim, it suffices to show
that mechanism µ (P ) is group strategy-proof. The proof is by contradic-
tion. Assume that there exists a nonempty set of agents S′ ⊂ S, P and
P ′S′ = (P
′
s)s∈S′ such that µ(P
′
S′ , PS\S′) (s)Rsµ(P ) (s) for each s ∈ S′ and
µW (P ′S′ , PS\S′) (s
′)Ps′µW (P ) (s′) for some s′ ∈ S′.
Let l = min
{
i | µ(P ′S′ , PS\S′) (si) 6= µ(P ) (si)
}
. For each i < l, µ(P ′S′ , PS\S′) (si) =
µ(P ) (si), then Al
(
P ′S′ , PS\S′
)
= Al (P ). First assume sl /∈ S′. In this case
µ
(
P ′S′ , PS\S′
)
(sl) = µ (P ) (sl), which yields a contradiction. Next assume
sl ∈ S′, then µ(P ′S′ , PS\S′) (sl)Pslµ(P ) (sl). Since Al
(
P ′S′ , PS\S′
)
= Al (P ),
µ(P ) (sl)Rslµ(P
′
S′ , PS\S′) (sl), which yields a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 1. From Theorem 1 in Kojima (2013) (1), (2) and (4)
are equivalent. Any group strategy-proof mechanism is, in particular strategy
proof, thus we have (3) =⇒ (2). Then, from Lemma 1 we derive the implication
(4) =⇒ (3), which completes the proof of the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We adapt the argument from the proof of Theo-
rem 1 in Kojima (2013). Let a, b ∈ C and t, u ∈ S as in the definition of essential
homogeneity. Let Pt and Pu such that Pt : b, a and Pu : a, b. Let qt = 2 and
qu = 1. Let P
′
t be such that P
′
t : b. For each s ∈ Sa \Sb, let Ps : a, b and qs = 1.
For each s ∈ Sb \ Sa, let Ps : b, a and qs = 1. For each s ∈ Sb ∩ Sa, set Ps : a, b
and qs = 2. For each s ∈ S \ (Sa ∪ Sc ∪ {t, u}), let Ps be such that ∅Psa, ∅Psb.
Then, in any stable mechanism ϕ, ϕ (P ) (t) = {a} and ϕ (P ′t , P−t) (t) = {b},
which completes the proof of the claim. 
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